Applied Research

Workplace Democracy and the
Problem of Equality
By Jared S. Colton, Avery C. Edenfield, and Steve Holmes

Abstract

Purpose: Professional communicators are becoming more invested in unique
configurations of power in organizations, including non-hierarchical and democratic
workplaces. While organizations dedicated to democratic processes may enact power
diﬀerently than conventional organizations, they may fall short of practicing equality.
This article explains the diﬀerences in non-hierarchical workplaces, considers businesses
where democracy is a goal, and argues for considering equality as a habitual practice,
particularly when writing regulatory documents.
Method: We conduct a review of the literature on non-hierarchical workplaces and
organizational democracy, applying Jacques Rancière’s concept of equality to two
examples (one using primary data collection and one using secondary data) of two
cooperatives where organizational democracy is integral to the design of the business.
Results: The literature review exposes an interest in mêtis (cunning, craftiness,
flexibility) as vital to practitioner success in non-hierarchical workplaces; however,
this article demonstrates that mêtis does not prevent inequality, even in organizations
expressly committed to workplace democracy.
Conclusion: Professional communicators need to consider equality not solely
as a structural resource (as in rules, laws, policies) but as a habitual practice to
cultivate alongside other characteristics and frameworks important to a professional
communicator’s toolkit.
Keywords: ethics, cooperative, communication, democracy, equality

Practitioner’s
Takeaway:

• Professional communicators should
be paying more attention to nonhierarchical workplaces, in particular,
those with democratic aims.
• Democratic workplaces demand
the development of certain ethical
dispositions/characteristics in
professional communicators: mêtis
and equality as an ongoing practice.
• While the goals of democratic
organizations are often noble,

inequalities can still emerge, thus
the need to recognize the equality
of oneself and others as an ongoing
ethical practice rather than something
solved solely through institutional
mechanisms.
• A heuristic, provided in the closing
of this article, prompts professional
communicators to examine their
practices in terms of equality.
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Introduction
Professional communicators are continually becoming
more invested in unique configurations of power in
organizations. One of the modest aims of this article
is to encourage more professional communicators
to consider democratic workplaces as valid areas of
research and employment. As Kimball (2006) rightly
notes, while technical and professional communication
(TPC) scholarship is expanding, most research still
assumes an institutionalized organization marked
by hierarchy and bureaucracy; however, as new
technologies have changed the way professional
communicators work, scholarship has shifted toward
investigating flatter, more autonomous practices in
the form of teams, networked organizations, and
how companies make use of rhetorics of employee
empowerment. Spinuzzi (2007, 2014), Clark (2006),
Winsor (2001), and Zachry (2000), for example, have
argued that relationships of power and communication
go beyond a top-down structure. Thus, even within
an apparently rigid bureaucracy, communication
and power are more complex than they may first
appear (Winsor, 2003). This research has unveiled the
many means by which organizations (even ostensibly
democratic ones) produce arrangements of power that
place one person over another (Clark, 2006; Longo,
2000; Winsor, 1996, 2003). This suggests that while
democratic organizations may enact power diﬀerently
than conventional organizations, they can fall short of
actualizing goals of equality.
As we state above, our main goal is to encourage
professional communicators to consider non-hierarchical
workplaces, in particular, democratic organizations, as
legitimate sites of TPC research and practice. Now, not
all non-hierarchical organizations aim to be democratic.
And while we make this distinction throughout this
article, we focus on workplace democracies in particular.
Democracy, of course, can function as a god-term, or
a term that carries high-emotional impact but may be
rarely examined. While there are many definitions of
democracy in political science and philosophy, we look
to the oft-cited Bachrach and Botwinich (1992), who
define workplace democracy as employees participating
equally “in decision making at all levels in which they
work” (p. 163).
In the first half of this article, we argue that
workplace democracies require practitioners to cultivate
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qualities such as mêtic intelligence and an ethical
disposition (in the sense of an Aristotelian virtue)
committed to equality as an ongoing practice. In the
second half, we apply our framework to two examples:
one from primary research data and one from secondary
data analysis. Through these examples, we show that
even workplaces with explicit democratic organizational
design can see acts of inequality emerge. We show that
the organizational conditions and written policies can
enable some employees to practice mêtis, making them
feel empowered/enabled, but these resources do not
necessarily extend to all employees.
Broadly, we argue that professional communicators
should remain interested in workplace democracy.
Such an investment should not assume that equality
inevitably occurs in those spaces, however. For
workplace democracy to succeed, it demands an ethic
that recognizes equality (and inequality) in everyday
practices and habits, not only in organizational design
and writing practices, such as dispute resolution
documentation or worker councils.

Overview of Non-Hierarchical Workplaces
TPC researchers such as Spinuzzi are beginning to
look at communication, project management, and
other workplace practices in non-hierarchical and
networked workplace configurations (2013, 2015)
and non-employee firms (2014). These organizations
are sometimes referred to as “horizontal” or “flat,” in
contrast to vertical or “top-down” arrangements. This
rhetorical framing enables stakeholders to envision
themselves as equal partners, even if some organizations
are “flatter,” or more democratic, than others.
Despite the movement to understand workplace
democracy in discourse and cultural studies for some
time now (see Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1986), TPC has
surprisingly little scholarship on the subject of workplace
democracy and the distinctions of non-hierarchical
organization. Spinuzzi, however, has taken up Waterman
Jr.’s (1990) ideas on adhocracies to include “all-edge
adhocracies”—which are highly collaborative, often
temporary team-based projects extending beyond the
organizational boundaries, or “edges” (Spinuzzi, 2015).
TPC scholarship also has shown interest in networking
and worker autonomy (Johnson-Eilola, 1996) and
extra-institutional practices (Kimball, 2006, 2017).
Outside of TPC scholarship, other researchers have
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considered innovative workplace structures, such as the
holacracy—a copyrighted management system operating
by autonomous teams with a central decision maker
(Robertson, 2015)—and distributed information-based
systems grounded in a knowledge sharing (see, for
example, Drucker, 1987; Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1986;
Skyrme, 2007; Thrift, 2005).
Nevertheless, many people are unfamiliar with,
skeptical of, or even resistant to alternative workplace
structures (Kastelle, 2013). For example, when Zappos
converted to a holacracy and oﬀered a severance
package to employees who did not want to remain
for the conversion, 29% of their workforce left the
company (Reingold, 2016). Distrust of unconventional
workplace practices also may be the cause of current
resistance to Agile project management strategies
(Denning, 2012). The values, practices, and frameworks
that are well-suited for conventional, bureaucratic
businesses, therefore, may not work in alternative
workplaces. The unique characteristics of these
structures require commitment to the development of
deliberate strategies, habits, and philosophies.
We point to these distinctions, because, while
scholars carefully consider arrangements of power in
an organization, many of us take the manifestation
of hierarchy for granted (Harrison, 1994, p. 249).
This is an assumption that Hart and Conklin (2006)
rightly critique when they argue for a redefinition of
the role of the professional communicator. Their study
participants showed “a vision of the profession that
is non-hierarchical and highly networked” (p. 412).
Nevertheless, as they point out, and as our own personal
experiences confirm, hierarchy is often assumed in TPC
pedagogy, practice, and research, and scholars from
related fields (business administration, communication
studies, etc.) have noted that many teach, manage, and
evaluate success under the following assumptions:
1. “You need a hierarchy to succeed,”
2. “The people who do the work are of lower status
than those who decide what work to do,” and
3. “Organizations that do not follow the norms are
likely to fail” (Kastelle, 2013; see, also, Alvesson &
Willmott, 2003; Spicer, Alvesson & Kärreman, 2009;
Cheney, 1995; Harrison, 1994; Rinehart, 2006).
Though the presupposition of bureaucratic
management remains persuasive and fundamental to
success for some, non-hierarchical and other democratic

businesses have challenged this assumption and its
underlying structuring of power. Scholars, practitioners,
and entrepreneurs alike have continued to challenge
the requirement of hierarchy by advocating for and
instituting alternative forms of organizing work.
In an extensive survey of organizational democracy,
Rothschild-Whitt (1979) compared collectivistdemocratic organizations to conventional, bureaucratic
organizations along eight points: authority, rules,
social control, social relations, recruitment and
advancement, incentive structures, social stratifications,
and diﬀerentiations (pp. 511–517). Using these points
of comparison, Rothschild-Whitt created a metric for
evaluating organizational democracy. While RothschildWhitt’s categories are almost four decades old, we
still find value in them as her study is one of the few
comprehensive studies of its kind. She categorized such
diﬀerent workplaces as falling along the following scale:

Figure 1. Scale of Organizational Democracy (Adapted from
Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p. 525)

According to Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) scale
(see Figure 1), non-hierarchical organizations can fall
anywhere along the first three categories but would
not include the last (hierarchical arrangements). In
this article, then, when we say “non-hierarchical,”
we refer to any type of arrangement within these
three categories. Importantly, the scale shows that
horizontalism, or non-hierarchy, does not equate
with democratic commitments. In other words, it is
important not to conflate non-hierarchy with workplace
democracy. For instance, adhocracies (Waterman Jr.,
1993; Spinuzzi, 2015) and holacracies (Robertson,
2015) are flat and non-hierarchical but not democratic,
in the sense that they are not rooted in democratic
goals. Organizations may try non-hierarchical
arrangements not because of ideological commitments
to democracy; instead, they may see these arrangements
as pragmatic to their goals of increased productivity
or employee buy-in (Craig & Pencavel, 1995; Kato,
Poutsma, & Ligthart, 2017; Valve, 2012; Zwick, 2004).
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What distinguishes a democratic workplace is not just
its methods but its end goals of highly participatory
employee engagement, more equally distributed
compensation, and/or more employee control of the
workplace (Bernstein, 1982; Brodwin, 2013; Cheney,
1995; Harrison, 1994), which we discuss further below.
Some well-known companies have experimented
with or otherwise adopted non-hierarchical workplaces
or ownership models, including the Associated
Press, Land O’ Lakes, Organic Valley, Recreational
Equipment Inc. (REI), tens of thousands of credit
unions, and democratically run businesses, such as
Patagonia, Github, Valve, WordPress, and 37Signals.
Understandably, some readers may question the
economic practicality of democratic workplaces,
because most of us are just not used to talking about
them. Nevertheless, the viability of such organizations
has been well documented (see, for example, Brodwin,
2013; Craig & Pencavel, 1995). While establishing the
viability of these organizations is beyond the scope of
this article, we do hope that the short list above shows
the growing need to investigate the non-hierarchical
workplaces in which professional communicators might
find themselves. This list should also demonstrate the
need to continually reevaluate how we understand
concepts such as democracy and equality.

Democratic Workplaces

While any organization can employ elements of
democracy, not all non-hierarchical structures are
necessarily committed to workplace democracy as an
end unto itself. Bernstein (1982) oﬀered one metric
to measure democracy in those workplaces explicitly
committed to democratic ideals. This metric has been
used to evaluate development strategies (Cheney, 1995)
still being used in cooperatives today (see cultivate.coop;
ica.coop; Mondragon Cooperative Corporation; nasco.
coop; University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives)
and is often cited in cooperative theory (Cheney, Santa
Cruz, Peredo, & Nazareno, 2014; May, Cheney, & Roper,
2007; Williams, 2007). Bernstein’s (1982) original metric
defines workplace democracy along the following points:
1. “The degree of control workers enjoy over any
particular decision,”
2. “The issues over which that control is exercised,” and
3. “The organizational level at which their control is
exercised” (p. 53; Cheney, 1995; see, also, Kaswan,
2013; Kato, Poutsma, & Ligthart, 2017).
56

Technical Communication

l

Volume 66, Number 1, February 2019

This metric demonstrates the most fundamental
aim of workplace democracy: participation (Cheney,
1995). As evidence, Bernstein describes participation
as occurring along a continuum (1982, p. 57). The
most minimal form of worker participation is the
“suggestion box,” in part “[b]ecause it lacks face-toface communication and frequently does not include
even a response by management” (Bernstein, 1982, p.
57). Bernstein names worker councils or assemblies
as best meeting the above metric, when workers exert
full control over the organization and managerial
decisions (1982, p. 58). Isthmus Engineering and
Manufacturing (Billeaux, Reynolds, Young-Hyman,
& Zayim, 2011) and Co-op Cab (discussed below)
are examples of such democratic control. Employee
participation rather than ownership is the fundamental
component of democratization because “firms which
are entirely worker-owned” can still “lack any degree of
democratization” (Bernstein, 1982, pp. 76–77), as in
the case of employee stock option plans.
In looking at organizations that are not top-down,
we must not conflate the diﬀerences among alternative
organizations. Flatter, or horizontal, businesses have
fewer levels of management and may distribute
knowledge and decision making more equally than
conventional businesses. That is, employees or teams of
employees may act autonomously, but the organization
may include centralized decision makers (Drucker,
1987; Robertson, 2015; Waterman Jr., 1993). In
contrast, an intentionally democratic business “involves
management that is less autocratic and confers more
power on individual employees” (Rayasam, 2008, para.
3). A workplace based on an ideal of democracy may
include voting systems, debates, town hall-style forums,
or branch autonomy (Rayasam, 2008).

One Type of Democratic
Workplace: The Cooperative

Historically, workplace democracy in the US has two
important threads: African-American collectivism and
the late 60s–70s counterculture. African-American
communities have engaged in collectivism since the
Antebellum era as a way to meet their economic
and political needs (Gordon Nembhard, 2014).
Communalism and collectivism arising from 60s–70s
anti-authoritarianism brought about communal
ownership and living arrangements, such as land trusts,
housing cooperatives, and communes (Rothschild-Whitt,
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1979). The contemporary cooperative in the US owes
its existence in part to these movements. At its most
bare definition, a cooperative is a business that is owned
by the people who use it (Gordon Nembhard, 2014,
p. 2) and that could fall under any of the categories
in Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) scale of organizational
democracy (see Figure 1), even hierarchical, depending
upon its degree of democratic commitments.
There are three types of cooperatives: consumer,
producer, and employee (Gordon Nembhard, 2014, p.
3). First, in consumer cooperatives, people pool their
resources to meet needs not supplied elsewhere or that
are too costly for individuals (p. 3). One example of
a consumer cooperative is neighbors in a food desert
opening a grocery store to provide healthy, aﬀordable
food options. The consumer cooperative may be the
most common and may feel to some shareholders
(consumers) to be the least democratic. Commonly, the
consumer would purchase a membership (a “share”)
and then exert control through electing their Board of
Directors or through other avenues provided by the
cooperative. A second type is the producer cooperative,
formed as a business that jointly purchases supplies or
jointly processes and markets goods and materials, for
example, agricultural cooperatives (Gordon Nembhard,
2014, p. 3). Finally, employee cooperatives are
formed so employees can “own and manage a business
themselves,” in order “to stabilize employment, make
policy, and share the profits” (Gordon Nembhard,
2014, p. 3). Though conditions may vary, of these three
types of cooperatives, an employee cooperative most
closely fits the definition of a democratic workplace,
because the employees have influence over how the
business is managed.
To this point, we have now designated the kind
of workplace most likely to engage in democratic
practices—a workplace committed to aims of employee
democracy. We have taken the time to make this
distinction in order to better prepare professional
communicators who might find themselves working
in any organization that lays claims to non-hierarchy
or democratic practices. Looking at these kinds of
organizations is important, because of TPC’s sometimes
over-emphasis on hierarchy and bureaucracy, especially
as professional communicators are more likely than
ever to find themselves working in some type of
non-hierarchical workplace (Hart & Conklin, 2006;
Johnson-Eilola, 1996).

It is important to recognize that even those
organizations committed to workplace democracy
may at times struggle to practice equal participation.
“Non-hierarchy” and “democracy” can sound sexy to
professional communicators looking to find meaningful
employment, but that does not mean they won’t find
themselves in an organization that falls short of its
democratic goals. In other words, just because an
organization has structural resources (policies, rules)
dedicated to democratic practices does not mean that its
employees automatically know how to practice equality,
something much easier said than done, and something
not easy to define. This is the larger point of this
article: that unless professional communicators have
developed certain ethical dispositions, they will struggle
or meet resistance when working in non-hierarchical
organizations, in particular, workplace democracies. In
the sections below, we further explicate this exigence,
advocate for examples of such ethical dispositions, and
then apply them to two examples.

The Exigence for Dispositions of
Mêtic Intelligence and Equality
We use the term disposition here in reference to
Aristotle’s virtue ethics (2004). Broadly conceived,
traditional definitions of ethics are defined as “the
study of values and proper conduct” (Markel, 2000, p.
21). Consistent with this definition, but more specific,
Aristotle described ethics as centered around the term
hexis, which can be translated as habit, comportment,
characteristic, or disposition. This focus on dispositions,
rather than fixed moral principles, is a result of his
belief—and that of many contemporary virtue ethicists
since (see, for example, Vallor, 2016)—that ethics are
messy, always context-specific, and cannot be pinned
down in any absolute sense. Nevertheless, this criticism
of fixed principles does not preclude agreement on
certain ethical dispositions. Some of Aristotle’s examples
of virtuous dispositions include patience, truthfulness,
and generosity. As a brief example, while two parties
might disagree on what a disposition of patience looks
like in some exact sense, usually they will agree that
patience is a moral characteristic, or disposition, that is
good for one to inhabit, for one to cultivate and develop.
One example of the kind of dispositions needed
for success in non-hierarchical spaces, and which
has received attention lately in TPC scholarship
Volume 66, Number 1, February 2019
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(Pope-Ruark, 2014; Wilson & Wolford, 2017), is
“mêtic intelligence.” Mêtis (cunning, craftiness) is a
term used by ancient Greek rhetoricians referring to the
cultivation of a flexible form of creativity that could be
used across particular or unexpected circumstances. It
is a form of what Aristotle (2004) called phronesis, or
the pragmatic forms of reasoning that characterize the
sort of everyday decisions professional communicators
make. A simple example of mêtis might be a
professional communicator determining the kinds of
euphemisms that are acceptable or appropriate to use
in a company-wide memo determining, explaining,
or critiquing bathroom policies regarding transgender
individuals. A person with a mêtic disposition will be
rhetorically flexible toward what (in this case) might
not be an everyday company memo—a memo that,
depending on the circumstances, may require a not-soeveryday response.
One argument for the need to cultivate mêtic
intelligence in professional communicators occurs
within a discussion of the software project management
strategy Agile (Pope-Ruark, 2014). Whereas traditional
project management philosophies such as “waterfall
planning” privilege top-down management that
supports a clearly defined final project, Agile is
specifically designed to be used in a non-hierarchical
space, whether that space is an organization as a whole
or simply a cross-functional team. Agile requires
the flexibility needed to respond to unexpected
circumstances, “situationally specific strategies, processes
and practices” (Anderson et al., 2005, emphasis in
original; qtd. in Pope-Ruark, 2014, p. 329).
In evaluating hierarchical versus non-hierarchical
management strategies, Pope-Ruark (2014) argues that
mêtis adds “depth to our reading of rhetorical situations,
decisions about appropriate response, creativity in
invention, and concern for ethical production” (pp.
327–328). The context of this comment occurs in her
discussion of how hierarchical content management
systems often require two rigidly stratified classes of
users: one responsible for setting tasks, the other waiting
upon instruction with little room for independent
initiative. By comparison, Agile predicates itself upon
a decentralized system where all project stakeholders
(whether managers, coders, engineers, subordinators,
etc.) are on equal footing in terms of the ability to create
and interact. In brief, Pope-Ruark (2014) claims that
using project management methodologies designed
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for non-hierarchical systems demands a certain kind of
professional communicator: one with a mêtic disposition.
We believe that this starting place is a crucial
spot for thinking about the complexities of ethics in
democratic workplaces. While the recent advocacy of
mêtic intelligence in TPC scholarship is persuasive,
one issue is that it carries no guarantee of the kind
of ethical behavior most professional communicators
would promote. One might very well find cunning
and craftiness in an “ethic of expediency” (Katz, 1992).
Dolmage (2016) also notes that mêtis is not necessarily
an ethical good; rather, it requires a supplemental
moral purpose to achieve ethical ends (p. 163). In a
comment we do not mean as critical, neither PopeRuark (2014) nor Wilson and Wolford (2017) define
the kind of supplemental ethics that a mêtic professional
communicator should embody. As we demonstrate
below, ethically questionable practices can occur even
in workplaces intentionally designed to be democratic.
These non-traditional workplaces that professional
communicators are becoming more invested in demand
more specific ethical supplementation.
Thus, just as mêtic intelligence is continuing to be
promoted in TPC scholarship, we believe it is necessary
to think more specifically about other kinds of ethical
dispositions that complement the methodologies, work
arrangements, and organizations that benefit from mêtic
intelligence. We believe that such additional ethical
supplementation includes a disposition committed
to equality, which understands equality not only as
a resource to distribute but as a habitual ongoing
practice that is a characteristic (or disposition) of a good
professional communicator.
For the remainder of this article, we apply such
a notion of equality—as a dispositional ongoing
practice rather than solely a resource to redistribute—
to two examples of intentionally designed democratic
workplaces: (1) a case study originally conducted by
Hoﬀman (2005) on an employee cooperative that
experienced ethical communication conflicts, and
(2) a primary study conducted by one of the authors
on a cooperative that saw social capital disrupt a
commitment to equality. We hope to show that, even
with the best intentions, and within organizations
intentionally designed with democratic values like
those described by Bernstein (1982), inequality can still
occur. For democratic and non-hierarchical workplaces
to succeed, then, practitioners need to approach
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equality as ongoing practice, as a crucial, habitual
characteristic of a professional communicator.

Equality as an Ongoing Practice
Most professional communicators will acknowledge
that ethics is a core value to the field. The field has
embraced what could be called ethical turns, including
social perspectives (Blyler & Thralls, 1993) and cultural
studies perspectives (Scott, Longo, & Wills, 2007),
which investigate issues of power and legitimacy.
However, even with these culturally conscious turns,
Dombrowski’s (1999) and Markel’s (2000) foundational
works on ethics in the field, and a special issue on ethics
more than a decade ago (Dragga, 2001), ethics courses
are still “not highly represented” in TPC curricula
(Meloncon & Henschel, 2013). Calling attention to
particular ethical frameworks, such as utilitarianism,
deontology, or virtue ethics is uncommon.
The recent calls for incorporating mêtic intelligence
in TPC (Pope-Ruark, 2014; Wilson & Wolford, 2017)
are clearly motivated by ethical concerns. In paying
attention to non-hierarchical spaces, Pope-Ruark’s (2014)
advocacy for mêtic intelligence is clearly motivated by an
implicit democratic or egalitarian ethic. That is, work on
mêtis is interested in philosophies that believe workers
feel more fulfilled or content and are more eﬀective in
their workplaces if they have greater influence. This is
not to say all work on mêtis is invested in equality or
that ethics always equates to equality, only that an ethic
invested in notions of equality appears to be a driving
force for those interested in workplace democracy.
Democratic workplaces are thus prime locations to
investigate the relationship of mêtis and equality. The
logistics of “horizontalism” are not necessarily diﬃcult;
however, the challenge comes in finding employees who
are committed to values of collective work (Hartman,
2010). For example, the use of a non-hierarchical
methodology may enable those who have cultivated
mêtis to have a better chance of succeeding within
a democratic workplace, but the creation of such a
space in no way guarantees that even those with mêtis
will take part in the type of egalitarian practices their
workplace would seem to demand.
To reiterate, the concept of mêtis, which a number
of scholars (Detienne & Vernant, 1991; Dolmage,
2009; Hawhee, 2013; Pope-Ruark, 2014; Scott, 2008;
Wilson & Wolford, 2017) have drawn upon in the

rhetorical tradition, is a form of “bodily intelligence”
(Hawhee, 2013, p. 46). It is often translated as cunning,
wily intelligence, or wisdom (Dolmage, 2009 p. 5).
Mêtis is an acquired type of intelligence that enables one
to act with cunning across a wide variety of contingent
rhetorical situations, a ‘‘flexible, context-attentive
intelligence” (Scott, p. 2008). It is precisely this capacity
for flexibility and context awareness that makes mêtis so
relevant to professional communicators.
If collective work demands or at least benefits
from professional communicators developing mêtic
intelligence, then such constraints also demand a
specific commitment to an ethical framework that
values equality. Much as some scholars (Detienne &
Vernant, 1991; Dolmage, 2009; Hawhee, 2013; PopeRuark, 2014; Scott, 2008) view mêtic intelligence
as a supplement to practical wisdom, we view a
dispositional ethic of equality as a necessary supplement
for eﬀective work to take place in non-hierarchical and
democratic spaces, whatever forms they may take. In
other words, for these workplaces to function as they
are designed, they also require participants to commit
to an ethic of equality. By a commitment to equality
we do not mean a general value in equality, such as in
the statement, “I believe we are all equals.” Rather, we
suggest a commitment to equality that recognizes that
even in the most democratically driven spaces—such as
employee-owned cooperatives—acts of inequality can
happen. Thus, a disposition committed to equality as
an ongoing practice is a necessary supplement to the
contemporary professional communicator’s toolbox. For
the articulation of such a disposition, we turn to the
French political philosopher Rancière (1995; 1999).
Rancière (1995; 1999), whose work has been
applied convincingly to U.S. contexts (see Ross,
1991; May, 2008), diﬀers from a number of other
contemporary political theorists, because he views
equality not as something to be distributed—that is,
as an institutional provision like a right to vote, which
is often the case for liberal notions of equality (see
Colton and Holmes, 2018)—but as a practice requiring
continual verification. Even within a representative
democracy, Rancière argues that hierarchies—what
he calls “partitions of the sensible”—will inevitably
form. In brief, by “sensible,” Rancière means that
hierarchical partitions seem intuitive to us. They seem
to be “common sense.” For example, even though
the Occupy Wall Street movement in Zucatti Park
Volume 66, Number 1, February 2019
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claimed an ideological commitment to democracy and
egalitarian governance, White male activists nevertheless
dominated group deliberations, and the Occupy
movement even faced accusations of anti-Semitism
(Berger, 2011). As a result, the Occupy Wall Street
participants were moved to eventually require a rule to
ensure that non-White and female speakers were able to
speak before a White male.
We use the example of Occupy Wall Street not
to dismiss the impact of this movement but more to
highlight Rancière’s argument that inequality and
hierarchy inevitably occur even when direct democracy
or equality is the designed system of distribution:
“‘Social reality’ is a reality of inequality” (1995, p.
48). A partition of the sensible can and will occur in
any text, discourse, community, law, family, church,
or organization, and these partitions can include any
cultural habit and/or practice that prohibits or limits
even one individual from being recognized as an equal.
A clear example is when segregation in the deep south
banned African-Americans from sitting in “Whites
only” restaurants. What Rancière (1995, 1999) calls a
verification of equality consists of acts of “dissensus”
(1999) that disturb any partition of the sensible, such
as when African-Americans staged sit-in protests in
“Whites only” diners. In Rancière’s terms, the protesters
sought to verify their own equality within a legal and
state-supported partition of the sensible that did not
recognize or intentionally masked their equality.
While a sit-in is perhaps an obvious example,
Rancière (1995; 1999) argues that partitions of the
sensible occur in even the most democratically designed
spaces, as our examples below demonstrate, sometimes
even in places marked by an abundance of consent.
For example, employees who cannot aﬀord to leave
their jobs may feel it necessary to consent to their
own mistreatment in order to stay employed. Thus,
understanding equality in Rancière’s terms means that
one is never complacent or content by the institutional
mechanisms or structures within which one is situated,
even if a particular structure was designed in the
name of democracy. If one is committed to equality
as Rancière sees it, one recognizes that any verification
of a person’s equality might be fleeting at best and
may require renewed practices of recognition: first,
the habitual re-appraisal of a situation to determine
whether someone’s equality may be going unrecognized
and, then, the demonstration (whether grand or small)
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that this someone (whether oneself or another) is an
equal and deserves to be treated as such. Again, as
counterintuitive as it may seem, such verifications
of equality can often take the form of dissent in
appearance. A demonstration that equality is not being
verified will disrupt the stable order of things, even if
that order was established through consent. While this
notion of equality as an ongoing practice may sound
exhausting, it is important to realize that we see this
notion of equality as dispositional, as a habit that can
be cultivated. While habits are not always easy to make
or break, the strength of Rancière’s idea of equality is
that it enables enactment anywhere; it does not require
institutional structures to verify one’s equality.
To make the significance of our connection
between Rancièreian equality and mêtis explicit to
professional communicators, we want to aﬃrm that we
are not arguing for a specific communicative act but
a disposition that can be applied to multiple forms of
technical writing. Equality in Rancière’s sense is akin
to an Aristotelian virtue ethic in that there is no fixed
version of its enactment, but it is a practice. According
to May (2001), practices comprise
(1) goal-directedness,
(2) social normative governance, and
(3) regularity of behavior.
First, practices have a purpose, an aim in mind.
Second, practices are governed socially and normatively:
Multiple people will know how to carry out the
practice, and there will be standards determining
(often multiple) correct and incorrect ways of doing it.
Finally, practices contain a regularity of behavior: “In
order for something to be a practice, the various people
engaged in it must be able to be said to be ‘doing the
same thing’ under some reasonable description of their
behavior” (May, 2001, p. 12). As a basic example, most
professional communicators practice proofreading
on some level, yet they proofread at diﬀerent times
for diﬀerent purposes (editing for content, grammar,
design, etc.). They do so diﬀerently but with enough
similarity that they can recognize the practice of
proofreading a document, and they recognize that there
are better and worse ways of proofreading.
Equality, then, is not something that is always
going to look the same to each person, and this can be
diﬃcult when trying to conceptualize it as a professional
communication practice; however, equality in Rancière’s
sense is based in practices, one’s repeated actions in
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re-verifying one’s or another’s equality whenever one
sees that equality being erased or ignored. This practice
of recognizing others’ equality could be employed when
writing policies, internal memos, manuals, even casual
emails (or not, as in the case of sexual harassment).
Thus, we claim that professional communicators
should develop dispositions in which they see equality
as a cultivated habit that might be put into practice in
diﬀerent situations and actions, including democratic
workplaces. Again, above any other contribution,
Rancière sees political equality as something that must
be continually re-verified by individuals whose daily
lives are impacted by partitions of the sensible and, in
turn, aided and allied by individuals who can recognized
this struggle in others and be in a position to be an ally
or advocate.

Cooperatives, Mêtic Intelligence, and
the Need for Dispositional Equality
Even democratically controlled organizations,
such as employee-owned cooperatives, can have
inequality demonstrated within their organizations.
Correspondingly, we see within these scenarios an ideal
opportunity to locate the need to cultivate dispositions
of mêtis and equality as an ongoing practice. One
example of such a demonstration of inequality within
a democratic workplace is found in Hoﬀman’s (2005)
case study of Coop Cab and Edenfield’s (2018) study of
Owen’s House Pub.
We look at these two examples (one is secondary
research; the other is primary research) for a variety of
reasons. First, each organization relies on professional
communication and documentation in order to
function, including dispute resolution documents such
as incident reports, grievance process instructions, and
related documents (Hoﬀman, 2005; Edenfield, 2018).
Some dispute resolution communication practices are
potentially extra-institutional, such as when employees
apply social pressure (Hoﬀman, 2005; Edenfield,
2018). Second, both define themselves as democratic
workplaces—workplaces that often require researchers
to look to alternative and non-expert sites that are
less conventional to TPC research, including taxicab
companies and pubs. While deciding what sites of
TPC research are legitimate can be an ideological issue
(Alvesson, 1991; Berlin, 1988; Blyer, 1995; Harrison,
1994; Herndl, 1991, 1993), we follow in the tradition

of those scholars and practitioners who view TPC
broadly (Johnson-Eiola, 2004; Kimball, 2006).
Hoﬀman’s (2005) study of Coop Cab focuses on
procedural justice and how men and women diﬀer
in their dispute resolution communication strategies,
formal and informal. A worker-owned cooperative
taxicab company, Coop Cab uses a Workers’ Council
to solve disputes after formal complaints. Hoﬀman
(2005) concludes that both men and women had
misgivings about the grievance process. According to
Hoﬀman (2005), when men had disputes, they saw
the cooperative structure as aﬀording them informal
(one might say mêtic) opportunities to discuss conflict
resolution with their worker supervisors; however, the
flat structure also “discouraged them from using the
formal grievance procedures,” as recourse through the
formal structure signified to them a failure to resolve
any issues they had with their peers (2005, p. 69).
On the other hand, Hoﬀman’s study showed that
women did not even consider the informal process.
Their choices were reduced to “raise a formal grievance
or to do nothing” (2005, p. 70). Thus, the ways that
grievances were resolved in this particular employeeowned business potentially produced unequal power
relations, in some cases leading to employees leaving,
and, in other cases, legal consequences.
Although she does not use the term, Hoﬀman
(2005) is clearly describing partitions of the sensible,
as Rancière would put it, as well as an institutional
context that could benefit from the cultivation of
mêtic dispositions committed to equality. Hoﬀman’s
study shows how “informal power and other societal
inequalities may suﬃciently permeate democratic
workplaces and perpetuate the diﬃculties women
contend with in formal grievance resolution” (2005,
p. 52). Put in terms of mêtis, certain informal
conventions of Coop Cab enabled men to practice
forms of cunning, craftiness, and flexibility in their
communication but seemed to restrict women from
participating in the same types of communication.
These conventions gave men an advantage in resolving
their grievances. Two diﬀerent examples of the
diﬃculties women faced in Coop Cab as a result of the
“informal power and social inequalities” include the
cases of “Ursula” and “Shirley.” According to Hoﬀman’s
study, Ursula was one employee of Coop Cab who
articulated that the grievance procedures were “to act
formally or not act at all,” and that not acting at all was
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sometimes better because of the stress and anxiety that
occurred as a result of the formal process (2005, p. 70).
She felt that the formal process placed the burden on
the person writing the grievance documentation:
It’s like, how much am I willing to put up with?
How much energy do I feel like putting into
paperwork and filing a grievance and trying to
articulate relatively minor things to other people?
Not necessarily that they are really minor, but I
don’t have that energy. It’s like, is it easier to fight
for certain things or is it easier to put up with it
and wait through it ’til you get to the end of it?
(Hoﬀman, 2005, p. 70)
A more extreme case is that of Shirley, who felt
her only recourse was to sue the cooperative. Hoﬀman
writes, “Shirley had brought several grievances before
the Workers’ Council and anticipated bringing more in
the future” (2005, p. 72). The Workers’ Council, whom
she saw as her peers, ruled that her grievance would
not make it to an oﬃcial hearing to be heard by the
Workers’ Council. Even though Shirley used a formal
process—writing a grievance report and submitting it
to the Workers’ Council—to ensure democracy, her
appeal was denied. This denial of a hearing was a clear
demonstration of a partition of the sensible emerging.
Similar to Ursula, Shirley did not see any recourse in an
informal process, even though the formal process failed
her; however, she felt so strongly about her grievance
that she decided to go outside of the cooperative via
a lawsuit. Unfortunately, one consequence of this
decision was that her fellow employees began to shame
her. This shaming bordered on harassment: “There were
things all over the bulletin board that anybody who sues
their own cooperative should get the fuck out if they’re
not happy. It’s like, if you don’t love your country, leave
it, so to speak” (qtd. in Hoﬀman, 2005, p. 72).
In contrast to Ursula’s and Shirley’s experiences,
the male employees at Coop Cab felt that tolerating
the anxieties of the formal process was not even an
issue. In this particular work environment, and from
their perspectives, their own experiences oﬀered no
partitions of the sensible to overcome. Rather than “this
or nothing,” the men’s choices were among an array of
informal dispute resolution options (Hoﬀman, 2005, p.
70). Most of the men at Coop Cab who had a grievance
believed that for most conflicts, the Workers’ Council
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did not need to be bothered, as another example from
Hoﬀman demonstrates:
Jon: You can’t get so worked up. Like some people
get all worked up and bring a grievance about
everything. That’s their right; that’s OK. But, me,
I like to just talk to the person. Like if I think a
dispatcher isn’t treating me fairly, I’ll just go and
talk to the guy and reason with him. I don’t get all
excited. (2005, p. 71)
In the cases of Jon, Ursula, and Shirley above,
structural equalities such as formal dispute processes are
“supposed” to be the same for everyone, but as these
examples demonstrate, the dispute resolution processes
opened the way for unequal treatment based upon
gender diﬀerence. Male employees were clearly able to
cultivate a rich sense of mêtis within these procedures,
as they felt they were able to be flexible in how they
communicated their disputes. However, these forms
of mêtis were not reflective of equality in Rancière’s
sense. For Rancière, someone committed to equality
will habitually re-appraise any situation in which even
one person may be treated as less than another, and,
in response, call for that person to be recognized as an
equal. This call to recognize one’s equality need not
be a grand political gesture. For example, we might
imagine that if the cooperative employees saw equality
as an ongoing practice, they would be more willing
to see that strict reliance on formal dispute resolution
communication might inadvertently create conditions
of unequal treatment. To rectify this situation, the
solution is not that women in the cooperative should
just adopt the mêtic practices of the men. Rather than
saying Ursula and Shirley shouldn’t “get so worked
up,” a hypothetical response rooted in equality from
Jon could have been that they should not have to get
so worked up. That is, Jon could have questioned
why he felt he had access to informal options and
they did not, and he could use his informal access
to advocate for them. The unstated decorum of the
workplace culture, even though explicitly committed to
democratic principles, created a partition of the sensible
that privileged men over women in terms of dispute
resolution communication practices.
Jon’s flexible reactions to disputes—i.e., accessing
informal methods of communication—were mêtic in
practice, but they did not recognize the women’s equality.
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If Jon worked out of a notion of equality as an ongoing
practice, then he likely would be more sympathetic
and even encouraging to Ursula and Shirley when they
used the formal grievance process. In this example,
then, we see that just because someone works in a
democratic workplace does not mean they will inherently
embody an ethic of equality. In other words, Coop Cab
demonstrates that, while democratic workplaces may be
able to cultivate a generalized sense of mêtis among some
employees (the men, in this case), there is no guarantee
that employees will treat each other fairly.
Of course, Coop Cab is not the only democratic
workplace whose admirable goals of democratic
participation are not without the challenges of unequal
power relations. Owen’s House, a pub in a workingclass neighborhood that operates through shared
management among 10–15 employees (ranging
from bartenders to cleaning staﬀ) and the Board of
Directors, also demonstrated the kinds of unfortunate
social inequalities that occurred in Coop Cab. As part
of Edenfield’s (2016) two-year study, five long-time
participants of Owen’s House were interviewed. One of
those participants, “Lamar,” mentioned in his interview
that when conflict arose over an issue not important
to an employee, it was expedient at times to allow
those with stronger feelings to influence or dominate
governance, ultimately shaping the cooperative in
ways that may not have reflected the organization’s
democratic commitments:
I feel like so many people involved are just nice
fucking people, not that they aren’t strong or not
willing to fight for shit, but it’s just not worth
it to deal with the negativity and the backlash
from standing up to someone. It allows people
who are more controlling to control because the
other people are like, “Okay, I’ll just keep going
and deal with my own shit.” When the potential
consequences are nastiness and negativity and it’s
something you don’t feel strongly about, it’s just
easier not to participate. The people who are more
forceful are the ones who are going to get their way
because the rest of us, while we care, in all these
little bitty things, it’s just not worth it. (Lamar,
personal communication, July 15, 2014)
Like Coop Cab, Owen’s House had grievance
processes dedicated to democratic procedures

(Edenfield, 2018). Nevertheless, as Lamar expressed
above, instances of inequality could still occur (and
not only along gender lines), even though democratic
principles were central to Owen’s House’s mission.
In cases such as these, consent is not necessarily
an absolute ethical good, as it can undermine the
democratic values of participation. Here, someone who
has cultivated a dispositional ethic of equality would
be wary of public unanimity or silent consent and look
for opportunities to recognize the equality of those
who are being silent, perhaps directly asking for dissent
at times. For example, at Owen’s House, those who
found themselves continually taking the lead on writing
and interpreting policy or taking the lead on projects
might pause and bring attention to the fact that they
are always leading the way, and that the same people
continually leading is not necessarily a good thing. Even
inadvertently, they may have perpetuated a partition of
the sensible, in Rancière’s terms. Taking equality into
consideration, they would refuse to accept silence as
consent; instead, they might invite others to participate,
to disagree openly, and to create a dialogue.
These examples help to demonstrate our argument
that while the cultivation of mêtic intelligence can lean
toward ethical outcomes, the process is by no means
inevitable. Inasmuch as partitions of the sensible
continue to emerge within even those organizations
explicitly committed to democratic principles, there
exists a distinct need to cultivate a dispositional ethic
of equality as an ongoing practice. This is a challenge.
Equality will not inevitably be achieved within a stable
distributive mechanism or institutional space by virtue of
the existence of that space, even if certain organizations
may engender these values more than others. Some
employees working in democratic workplaces may
be more inclined to come forward, to participate, to
be opinionated. In certain instances, those people
may be the appropriate person for the particular job.
Nevertheless, a dispositional ethic of equality will
habitually scrutinize the knee-jerk response to always
look toward those same people to take the lead.

Conclusion and Notes Toward Cultivating
Dispositions of Mêtis And Equality
Professional communicators do have the power to
influence practices of workplace equality. A professional
communicator always has some agency to impact the
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practice of equality, particularly if she finds herself
in a democratic workplace. That is why cultivating
dispositions committed to equality matters: A
professional communicator can enact change.
There are three important points we would like our
readers to take away from this article:
• Professional communicators should be paying
more attention to non-hierarchical workplaces—
particularly those committed to democracy.
• Democratic workplaces demand the development
of certain ethical dispositions/characteristics in
professional communicators: mêtis and equality as
an ongoing practice.
• While the goals of democratic organizations are
often noble, inequalities can still occur, thus the
need to recognize the equality of oneself and others
as an ongoing ethical practice rather than something
solved solely through institutional policies.
While developing an ethical disposition committed
to equality is no easy task, one of the ways people can
consciously begin to do so is through reflecting on their
practices. While developing new habitual practices
is always a challenge, and a more in-depth guide to
developing such habits is beyond the scope of this
article, we do want to suggest questions adapted from
May (2001) that individual professional communicators
can ask themselves about their organization’s practices
when writing for dispute resolution and other
regulatory documentation:
1. Goal directedness: What is the aim of this practice?
What is our goal? In working toward that goal, are
people being treated as equals in a given situation?
2. Social normative governance: What formal and
informal processes and policies are preventing
people from being treated as equals? What would it
take to change those processes? What stakeholders
are involved? Whose voice is not being heard?
3. Regularity of behavior: How can we redirect or
change the habitual element of the practice that is
undermining a person’s equality? How can we make
a habit of new behaviors that do support equality?
We realize that these questions are open-ended and
only a starting point. Answering these questions is not
easy and will not always look the same. Professional
communicators asking themselves these questions
should realize that this kind of reflection is not a “one
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and done.” Rather, continually reflecting on equality
should be integrated into any organization that lays
claim to democratic principles. This point is not to
undermine democratic workplaces as “not really” doing
equality, but, rather, we hope to help cooperatives and
other democratic workplaces do what they do better.
Practicing equality is not something that can be solved
by institutional policy alone or by simply saying, “Let’s
be democratic.” First, we must recognize that equality is
an ongoing practice and one that needs to be cultivated
as a dispositional habit.
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